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ABSTRACT 
 
Structural changes in the global agrifood value chain have transformed food production in developing 
countries including Indonesia. One element of this is the spread of supermarket retailing. By increasing 
the demand for and returns to higher quality produce, this development has the potential to improve 
living standards in a sector where poverty has been persistent. Many studies have shown the 
magnitude of price premiums available to farmers who sell to supermarkets. However, little attention 
has been paid to how the introduction of a supermarket retailer affects those farmers who continue to 
sell to traditional market channels. Our data suggests that in regions where there are both modern and 
traditional buyers, competition effects result in the immiserization of farmers who continue to sell to 
traditional markets. This result underlines the fact that while sectorial transformation has desirable 
poverty reduction potential, actual impacts are lumpy. The distribution of farmer participation in a 
region may result in a case where the upgrading of agrifood supply chains can increase poverty in the 
absence of policy interventions. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: agrifood value chain, Indonesia, quality price premium, small farmers, supermarket  
 
JEL Classification: O13, Q13 
 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent decades have seen a transformation in global agrifood value chains. Features of this new 
environment include increased global demand for higher quality food products, value chain 
modernization, and a more vertically organized buyer–supplier structure. Among developing countries, 
an important physical manifestation of these changes has been the spread of supermarkets. 
 
The rise of supermarkets throughout the developing world over the past 2 decades reflects the 
broader economic trends of income growth, urbanization, and liberalized trade (Reardon et al. 2009; 
Reardon, Henson, and Berdegué 2007; Reardon, Berdegué, and Timmer 2005; Reardon et al. 2003; 
Neven et al. 2006). Developing countries have been able to capture a significantly increasing share of 
world trade in high value agricultural goods (Diop and Jaffee 2005), which positively impacts gross 
domestic product growth. Yet, gains are not evenly distributed and poverty remains stubbornly 
concentrated in rural areas.1  
 
Supermarket entry is accompanied by the introduction of modern supply chain logistics. 
Logistical upgrading offers an important channel through which farmers can move up the value chain 
(Minten, Randrianarison, and Swinnen 2009; Reardon et al. 2009; Reardon and Timmer 2007; 
Swinnen 2007). There is evidence from Kenya (Rao and Qaim 2010; Neven et al. 2009), the People’s 
Republic of China (Miyata, Minot, and Hu 2009), Viet Nam (Moustier et al. 2010) and other 
developing economies showing that farmers who successfully plug into the modern supply chains 
experience income improvements, sometimes dramatically.2 Our study reinforces this result by 
showing that for the case of small chili farmers in Indonesia, there is a positive price differential for 
sales to supermarkets versus traditional wet markets, even when we control for quality. 
 
But there are two features of supermarket presence that suggest their impact may not be 
unambiguously poverty reducing. First, supermarkets coexist alongside traditional wet markets. On the 
retailer side, the literature has highlighted the negative impacts the presence of a modern retail 
channel can have on traditional retail markets. It has shown, for example, that losses occur to both 
small-scale grocery shops (Natawidjaja et al. 2007; Reardon, Henson, and Gulati 2010) and traditional 
wet market retailers (Schipmann and Qaim 2011; Suryadarma 2011; Yaningwati, Achmad, and 
Susilowati 2012). While it follows that producers who continue to supply to traditional retailers may 
also be negatively impacted in the presence of supermarket buyers—for example, if there are changes 
to returns to quality or postharvest sorting activities—this, to our knowledge, has not been explored in 
the literature. 
 
A second feature is that supermarkets tend to source, at least initially, from larger and more 
established suppliers, which excludes small farmers (Reardon et al. 2007, Natawidjaja et al. 2007, 
Reardon and Berdegué 2002). The literature has looked into the factors that determine selection into 
the modern food retailing channel. But this leaves out any understanding of the dynamics of how 
farmers who continue to supply only to traditional wet markets fare. Are they impoverished by their 
inability to supply through the newly available modern channel? Or do they gain from knowledge and 
price spillovers in this environment? 
 
The questions raised above all relate to the central question that motivates this paper: how 
does modernization in the agrifood sector impact small farmers who continue to engage only with 
                                                
1  IFAD (2010) estimates that more than two-thirds of the 1.4 billion people who live in extreme poverty are located in rural 
areas. 
2  See also Hernández, Reardon, and Berdegué 2007 for Guatemala; Reardon et al. 2007a for Mexico; and Natawidjaja et al. 
2007 for Indonesia. 
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traditional buyers? Using a survey of 597 chili farmers in Indonesia we compare how the price premium 
attached to chilies of higher observable quality is affected by the presence of a supermarket channel. 
Chili producers are chosen because chilies are a high value agricultural product in Indonesia and an 
important vegetable consumed daily by most Indonesian families. Unlike other fresh vegetable 
products which are harvested all at the same time, chilies can be harvested weekly or fortnightly over a 
month or more providing a steady cash flow for producers. 
 
We expect to find that the price premium for high quality chilies is higher when the destination 
is a supermarket as opposed to a traditional market. We also go beyond this direct comparison to ask 
whether the price premium offered in the traditional market is affected by the presence of a 
supermarket. The answer to this question has important policy implications for countries seeking to 
address high rates of rural poverty by attracting foreign investment in agriculture. 
 
We begin in Section II by presenting a conceptual framework for understanding the dynamics 
of the interaction between supermarkets and traditional markets in the early stages of market 
penetration. Section III describes the dataset. In Section IV we present the empirical model and test 
the hypothesis that the presence of a modern supply chain will weaken the price–quality relationship in 
traditional markets. Section V offers some policy recommendations drawn from the analysis. 
 
 
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Following trade liberalization in the 1990s, supermarkets experienced a swift expansion in market 
penetration globally (Reardon et al. 2009, Neven et al. 2006). Indonesia was part of the second of 
three established waves of supermarket diffusion into developing countries. The growth in 
supermarkets’ average share of retail sales in Southeast Asia increased from 5%–10% in 1990 to 30%–
50% by the mid-2000s (Reardon and Gulati 2008, see figure below). This is expected to continue as 
increasing numbers of shoppers are willing and able to pay price premiums for convenience, food 
quality, and food safety (Mergenthaler, Weinberger, and Qaim 2009; Pingali 2007; Minot and Roy 
2006; Traill 2006; Regmi and Dyck 2001). 
 
Number of Supermarkets in Indonesia, 1968–1997
 
 
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik 2002.
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The introduction of a modern retailer transforms the existing food retail sector through two 
major activities. The first is the modernization of the procurement system. Throughout the 
procurement value chain, modern retailers promote upgrading of the prevailing logistics system 
(Neven and Reardon 2004). 
 
A second and related transformational activity is the promotion of food quality standards—
in particular, health and safety standards. These standards are often “private” in that they are 
devised and enforced by the retailer rather than the host government. There are several reasons 
modern retail adopt private standards: to substitute for missing or inadequately enforced public 
standards (Berdegué et al. 2005); to differentiate their product from the traditional retail format 
(Balsevich et al. 2003, Henson and Reardon 2005); and/or to incentivize and provide guidelines for 
producers to increase quality (Reardon and Swinnen 2004, Weatherspoon and Reardon 2003, 
Reardon and Barrett 2000). 
 
The introduction of standards by supermarket retailers impacts suppliers in an established 
trajectory (Berdegué et al. 2005). At the beginning, when the modern channel starts to source locally, 
the implementation of private standards results in a procurement system that skims the high quality 
products from traditional wholesale value chains. At this stage, the implemented standards are basic 
and are often confined to cosmetic and flavor characteristics, which can be identified directly by 
looking at the product. 
 
Later, when specialized wholesalers become established, supermarkets enforce standards 
related to unobservable food traits such as pesticide residues or the presence of pathogens. This is the 
stage in which Indonesia exists. The enforcement of unobservable standards such as these is necessary 
for the supermarket to manage its procurement from both abroad and from local producers. In 2006, 
supermarkets accounted for about 30% of the overall grocery retail sales in Indonesia, of which fresh 
fruits and vegetables account for 10% to 15% (Natawidjaja et al. 2007). 
 
For the Indonesian chili farmers with whom this paper is concerned, the presence of 
supermarkets impacts their income through two effects. First, there is a differentiation effect whereby 
supermarkets, in comparison to traditional buyers, pay their suppliers higher overall premiums for any 
given quality product. This is reflected in higher consumer prices that are used to signal that 
supermarket products have more desirable, but unobservable quality characteristics. Second, there is a 
competition effect. Supermarket entrance increases aggregate demand for high quality chilies. This 
new source of demand affects the prevailing price premium offered by buyers from the traditional 
market. Below, we consider these two effects in greater detail. 
 
A. Differentiation Effect: Supermarkets Pay Higher Quality Premiums 
 
Prior to supermarket entry in developing countries, national food quality standards generally do not 
exist or are not stringently enforced (Berdegué et al. 2005). In part, this is due to the degree of 
informality in the food industry, which makes quality control difficult (Jeo 2010, Reardon et al. 2009). 
At this stage, traditional wet markets are the main providers of fresh produce to the population. As a 
result of the lack of quality assurance, traditional wet market retailers cannot differentiate their 
products from their competitors in terms of health and safety standards. Similarly, it is difficult for the 
consumers to differentiate between safe and unsafe goods. Consequently, traditional retailers 
compete among each other based on prices of observable quality attributes such as size. 
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Upon entry, supermarkets initially target only higher income consumers. To attract these 
consumers, supermarkets differentiate their goods from traditional wet markets by advertising their 
provision of quality assurance through certification and branding (Fulponi 2006). Products of higher 
observable quality are marked with higher retail prices. This price premium makes supermarket 
products unaffordable to lower income consumers, which results in dual markets. These markets differ 
in terms of unobservable product quality provided to the population as well as the price charged. At 
this stage, traditional markets and supermarkets target distinct market segments and are not directly in 
competition with one another. 
 
As the supermarket retail format spreads geographically within a developing country—as it has 
in Indonesia—and as the country develops, an increasing number of consumers gain awareness about 
food quality. The resulting rise in consumers’ willingness and ability to pay a premium for food quality 
and safety increases the demand for high quality food (Mergenthaler, Weinberger, and Qaim 2009). 
Supermarkets continue to pay a premium to farmers who can meet their private quality control 
standards to ensure continuous supply of goods of given quality (Hernández, Reardon, and Berdegué 
2007). 
 
At the same time, as the domestic fresh produce market continues to evolve, the premium 
price paid by supermarkets to farmers who can meet private quality standards weakens. This occurs 
as public standards evolve in response to consumer demands for greater information disclosure 
about food attributes (Josling, Roberts, and Orden 2004). Improvement in public food safety 
monitoring further ensures that a higher percentage of products sold in traditional wet markets will 
meet public health requirements. In short, decreasing food safety concerns and a shrinking quality 
differential between products sold in different retail formats increases competition between 
supermarkets and traditional wet markets and prices begin to converge (Suryadarma et al. 2007, 
Suryadarma 2011, Schipmann and Qaim 2011) 
 
Thus, we expect the differentiation effect to confirm our first hypothesis that supermarkets 
pay higher returns to their suppliers for goods of a given observable quality than do traditional markets. 
The trajectory of supermarket development suggests that supermarkets pay a higher farm gate price to 
reward the unobservable health and safety standards that differentiate their products from visibly 
identical wet market produce. Over time, the price premium will fall, but it will not go to zero since it is 
also meant to compensate farmers for the uncertainty and the risk involved in the investment required 
to meet these standards. 
 
B. Competition Effect: Supermarkets Dampen Price Premiums in Traditional Markets 
 
In both modern and traditional retail settings, products with more desirable observable characteristics 
command premium retail prices. In geographic areas where produce is only available in traditional wet 
markets, observable qualities are the only way for consumers to differentiate among fresh produce. 
This remains true where public health and safety standards exist, but are poorly enforced.3 This 
situation allows us to establish a baseline for price premiums available to farmers in the period prior to 
supermarket competition. 
 
In areas where supermarket retailers compete with traditional market buyers, we expect that 
supermarkets will pay a higher premium than traditional buyers for all levels of observable quality. This 
results from the differentiation effects discussed in the previous section where the ability to certify 
                                                
3  Mergenthaler, Weinberger, and Qaim (2009) show for the case of Viet Nam that while government standards exist, the 
inability of the responsible regulatory body to provide quality and hygiene controls has resulted in asymmetric information 
and distrust between producers and consumers. 
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unobservable characteristics enables supermarkets to charge price premiums to signal the presence of 
unobservable quality characteristics. 
 
In addition to the differentiation effect which raises the returns to farmers who sell produce to 
supermarkets, we also expect that the presence of supermarket competition will dampen observable 
quality premiums paid by buyers for the traditional markets. The literature suggests one reason for this 
effect in fresh produce markets is intermittent episodes of excess supply of high quality produce in 
traditional markets (Barrett et al. 2010). This occurs when the products intended for supermarket 
buyers either do not meet the agreed quality standards or when the buyer simply did not show up to 
collect and pay for the requested produce. As observed in Ghana, India, and Nicaragua, when a 
shipment fails to meet the quality and safety standards of the supermarket, the producer is left with 
the sole option of selling to the local market at a much lower price. 
 
This dynamic only exists in competitive markets. The differential will not change for farmers 
who sell to traditional buyers in geographic areas where the option to sell to supermarkets does not 
exist. The reason for this is that in regions where the modern retail channel is not available, cases of 
excess supply of produce with high unobservable quality characteristics do not exist. 
 
 
III. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
 
Data for this study comes from a 2010 household survey of chili producers in West Java, Indonesia 
(see Sahara 2012). The survey was undertaken to study rural welfare outcomes in the presence of 
supermarket buyers. To accomplish this, survey questions documented the average farm gate price 
farmers receive for their chilies in the most recent season for which the harvest is complete. By taking 
the average of the most recent transaction in the same season, the within seasonal price differential is 
smoothened. Since the reported price can be of harvest from different season, we added seasonal 
control later in each regression. The majority of survey respondents are small farmers who own on 
average 4,525 square meters of land. About 10% have more than 1 hectare, while around 70% have less 
than 0.5 hectare, which makes it difficult to benefit from scale economies. 
 
The survey sample is stratified by market channel to ensure sufficient representation of 
producers who supply both the traditional and modern markets. Three districts in West Java are 
purposely selected—Garut, Ciamis, and Tasikmalaya. With Garut being a major production zone and 
Ciamis and Tasikmalaya, being the district with a substantial number of farmers selling to the 
supermarket. Next, subdistricts were selected by applying systematic random sampling, followed by 
another round of random selection of three villages from each subdistricts. In the end, 42 villages were 
selected. Finally, 12 households in each village were drawn from a list of chili-producing household data 
compiled from the land tax office. The dataset consists of responses from 506 chili farmers selected 
from the above procedure (see Sahara 2012 for more detail). 
 
Garut is a district with no evidence of supermarket buyers. That is, all farmers sell their produce 
to buyers for traditional wet markets. In Ciamis, both supermarket and traditional buyers are present 
and farmers selling to both are sampled. Similarly, Tasikmalaya is a district where both supermarket 
and traditional buyers are present, but the random sampling captured only farmers who supply to the 
traditional market. 
 
This differentiation among the sampling districts enables us to identify three cohorts of 
farmers. First are traditional wet market suppliers (traditional, T) where no alternative modern channel 
is available. This includes all farmers in Garut. Second are modern channel suppliers where both 
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modern and traditional buyers operate (modern/competitive, M/C). These are the 112 farmers in the 
Ciamis group that supply chilies to supermarkets. Third are suppliers to traditional wet markets in 
regions where both modern and traditional buyers operate (traditional/competitive, T/C). These are 
the 94 farmers in Ciamis and 104 farmers in Tasikmalaya who supply traditional markets (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Number of Observations for Farmers by Downstream Buyers and District 
 
Sample District 
Downstream Buyer
Traditional Supermarket Total 
Ciamis   94 (T/C) 112 (M/C) 206 
Tasikmalaya 104 (T/C) 0 104 
Garut 287 (T) 0 287 
Total 485 112 597 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey dataset (Sahara 2012, ACIAR 2010). 
 
Differentiation among these three types of farmers enables us to measure the impact of 
supermarket presence via two comparisons. First, the comparison of the prices received by M/C 
market suppliers in comparison to traditional suppliers illustrates the basic differentiation effect that 
supermarkets pay more. Second, a comparison between T/C market participants and traditional 
market participants shows how premiums in the traditional markets adjust to the presence of modern 
retail alternatives. 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
The average price per kilo received by the three types of producers is reported in Table 2. Producers who 
sell their chilies to supermarket buyer in competitive markets receive significantly higher average prices 
than both producers who sell to traditional buyers in competitive markets and also those who have no 
choice but to sell to traditional buyers. The average price is also significantly different between the 
traditional wet market suppliers in different districts (with and without competition from modern buyers). 
 
The three categories of producers sell chilies of comparable size. Around 25% of the output 
consists of medium-sized chilies, 34% consists of small-sized chilies, and 40% of the basket is made up 
of large-sized chilies.4 In terms of chili types, the traditional market famers produce mainly the curly 
type (68%), the T/C market farmers mainly produce long, straight chilies, while the modern market 
farmers produce diverse types of chilies (Table 2). 
 
The survey finds that farmers selling to supermarket buyers are most likely to invest in 
postharvest activities. Around 50% of all M/C market participants sort their outputs by size (small, 
medium, and large); color (bright color, red or green depending on the type of chilies); and quality (no 
rotten or damaged chilies), while only around 15% of the traditional and T/C market participants 
engage in these activities. 
 
There are differences in the household characteristics between producers in the three market 
segments (Table 3). Households in Garut, where only the traditional market channel is available, differ 
significantly from households in districts where there are modern sector activities. Farmers in Ciamis and 
                                                
4  The chili size categories used in this paper are a simplified version of the original 9-graded sizes documented in the survey. 
Since there are limited observations in some grading groups, we compiled the 9-graded sizes into three categories: small, 
medium, and large. An alternative 5-size conversion is also employed in the robustness check. The two added categories 
are grand and no grading. They add to the existing 3-size categories by the following order: no grading, small, medium, 
large, and grand. 
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Tasikmalaya where both modern and traditional buyers operate are on average 3 years younger, have 2 
more years of formal education, live closer to an asphalt road and have a smaller household size as 
compared to the traditional market producers where there is no competition from supermarkets. Within 
these two regions, producers who sell to the M/C market are still much younger and have even more 
education than those who sell to the T/C buyers. 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
(Mean) Traditional 
Traditional/
Competitivea 
Modern/
Competitiveb 
Diff. between the 
Two Competitive Marketsc 
Price 5,950.27 6,551.64*** 8,187.57*** *** 
Size category 
Small 0.36 0.33 0.33
Medium 0.28 0.24* 0.25
Large 0.36 0.43*** 0.42**
Postharvesting activities 
Size sorting 0.06 0.12*** 0.40*** *** 
Color sorting 0.15 0.13 0.55*** *** 
Quality sorting 0.15 0.19** 0.54*** *** 
Types of chili produced 
Hot beauty and hot chili 0.08 0.22*** 0.33*** *** 
Long straight 0.03 0.42*** 0.29*** *** 
Curly 0.68 0.17*** 0.29*** *** 
Others 0.21 0.19 0.09*** *** 
Notes: 
a  Significance level reported in this column refers to the mean value difference between traditional/competitive market and traditional market. 
b  Significance level reported in this column refers to the mean value difference between modern/competitive market and traditional market. 
c  Significance level reported in this column refers to the mean value difference between traditional/competitive and modern/competitive market. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 3: Household Characteristics 
 
(Mean) Traditional
Traditional/
Competitivea
Modern/ 
Competitiveb 
Diff. between the  
Two Competitive Marketsc
Household size (count) 4.78 4.28*** 4.32***  
Age of household head (years) 46.53 45.94 43.52*** * 
Age of the spouse (years) 40.61 39.42 37.75***  
Education of household head (years) 5.87 7.24*** 7.99*** ** 
Education of the spouse (years) 6.05 7.47*** 7.82***  
Reading ability of household head (dummy, 1=yes) 0.93 0.98** 1.00***  
Reading ability of spouse (dummy, 1=yes) 1.00 1.00 1.00  
Household members, age 15–65 years (%) 0.64 0.68** 0.65  
Household members, age above 65 years (%) 0.02 0.03 0.04*  
House area (square meter) 245.08 249.37 267.71  
ln(house value) 17.58 17.53 17.62  
Distance to road (kilometer) 0.44 0.09*** 0.12***  
Notes: 
a  Significance level reported in this column refers to the mean value difference between traditional/competitive market and traditional market. 
b  Significance level reported in this column refers to the mean value difference between modern/competitive market and traditional market. 
c  Significance level reported in this column refers to the mean value difference between traditional/competitive and modern/competitive 
market. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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IV. RESULTS 
 
We employ a hedonic model for chilies produced across different market segments to analyze the 
relationship between product quality and farm gate prices. The model is based on consumer choice 
and assumes that product price can be decomposed into value for individual product attributes 
(Lancaster 1966, Lucas 1975). The product attributes we test for include the observable qualities of 
size and sorting. 
 
A.  Regression Outputs 
 
The regression specifications used here measure the effect of product attributes on price. We unpack 
product prices into the values for individual product attributes. Size and postharvest sorting activities 
are the two observable product quality attributes documented in the survey, which we use to study its 
effect on the farm gate price producers receive. We then run separate regressions for each of the three 
types of farmers since we expect to see significant differences in rewards for quality by different buyers 
depending on whether or not they are facing competition. A Chow test confirms that data from 
different types of farmers cannot be pooled. This is an indication that downstream retail buyers have 
significantly different quality preferences and that unobservable quality characteristics segment the 
markets. Hence, we run ordinary least squares regressions for price on the two product attributes for 
each market k, where k∈(M/C,T/C,T) for modern/competitive, traditional/competitive, and traditional. 
 
lnሺ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௞ሻ ൌ ܽ௞ ൅ ߚͩ,௞ሺݏ݅ݖ݁ሻ ൅ ߚͪ,௞ሺݏ݋ݎݐ݅݊݃ሻ ൅ ܿ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ε 
 
The dependent variable in all model specification is the log price. The two quality attributes 
included in the model are size and postharvest processing. These are included as dummy variables. 
The baseline for comparison is defined by small-sized chilies and products sold without any 
postharvest processing. The three columns in Table 4 show the price differentials between different 
quality attributes.5 
 
In the traditional market where no supermarket competition is present, we find that medium- 
and large-sized chilies are 10% and 25% higher in price as compared to the small chilies (Table 4, 
column 1). Supermarket buyers offer an even higher price reward at 25% and 34% (see, column 3). The 
model finds that the difference in premium paid for the medium- and large-sized chili is significant 
only among producers selling to traditional market buyers, but not the producers selling to modern 
market buyers (last row, Table 4). The significant difference in quality premium between the modern 
and traditional market suggests that the unobservable quality difference between the products 
marketed to the two channels may play a role. 
 
The quality return mechanism in the traditional market where there is supermarket 
competition is weak. The price for the medium-sized chilies in the traditional/competition market is 
indifferent from the small-sized chili, while the large-sized chilies has a price premium of only 17% 
higher than the small-sized chilies (Table 4, column 2). This is much less than the 25% markup enjoyed 
by farmers who sell to traditional markets where there is no supermarket competition. The coefficients 
                                                
5  All model specifications include chili type, season fixed effects, as well as within season harvesting period fixed effect 
(early, middle, late). Chili of types other than hot beauty, hot chili, other TW chili or curly chilies are used as the 
comparison base group. The first production season (around April) is the comparison base for the three cultivating 
seasons, while the early harvesting period is the comparison base for the within season fixed effect controls (middle and 
late). A district dummy for Tasikmalaya is added in the T/C model since the sample consists of producers from both the 
Ciamis and Tasikmalaya district. The negative sign of the Tasikmalaya district dummy indicates the chili price Tasikmalaya 
producers receive is on average lower than the price received by producers in the Ciamis district. 
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reflect our prediction of a competition effect, for which producers who continue to supply traditional 
markets are negatively affected when their neighbors seize the modern marketing opportunity. 
 
Among the postharvesting activities, sorting products by size is most well rewarded. The 
magnitude of the price reward for sorting by size is highest in the traditional market (35%) where there 
is no competition from supermarkets. Even when there is supermarket competition, farmers receive 
more when selling size-sorted chilies to the traditional market (14%) than the premium they receive in 
the modern market (16%). 
 
Table 4: Price Reward to Different Quality Attributes 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Traditional Traditional/Competitive Modern/Competitive 
Medium  0.098* (1.862) 0.094 (1.198) 0.254** (2.331) 
Large 0.248*** (4.492) 0.165* (1.937) 0.343*** (2.985) 
Sort by size 0.348*** (3.884) 0.161** (2.027) 0.139** (1.978) 
Sort by color –0.092 (–1.518) 0.074 (0.929) –0.151** (–2.199) 
Sort by quality –0.006 (–0.096) –0.033 (–0.524) 0.032 (0.452) 
Hot beauty 0.431*** (5.225) –0.440*** (–5.666) 0.100 (0.850) 
Straight  0.108 (0.870) –0.288*** (–4.059) 0.179 (1.514) 
Curly 0.311*** (5.921) 0.008 (0.094) 0.126 (1.077) 
Season controls (April as base line)     
Dry, July 0.009 (0.138) –0.035 (–0.552) –0.006 (–0.073) 
Rain, September 0.034 (0.724) –0.073 (–1.309) –0.148** (–2.024) 
Within season controls (early as base line)     
Middle 0.166*** (3.412) –0.051 (–0.744) –0.050 (–0.546) 
Late  –0.036 (–0.675) –0.334*** (–3.765) –0.076 (–0.630) 
Tasikmalaya   –0.522*** (–10.256)   
constant 8.077*** (122.073) 9.090*** (90.532) 8.644*** (52.462) 
adjR2 0.124  0.322  0.116  
Medium versus Large, t-test (significant if <0.05) 
 0.0058  0.3461  0.3503  
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01; ^ are p-value for Prob. > chi2. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Sorting the products by color or other quality characteristics is not important. Data indicate 
that the modern and traditional buyers offer lower prices to color-sorted products (15% and 9%). Since 
production that produces mixed-color chilies is a sign of lack of standardization or poorer quality input 
of seeds, it may be that output which requires sorting by color may imply that it is of a poorer quality 
batch. The dummy variable indicating sorting by quality is insignificant. This is probably because we 
have already controlled for other quality sorting activities in other variables. 
 
B. Robustness Check 
 
The robustness check results presented in Table 5 have similar model specifications to the previous 
section. The only difference is that we use alternative size categories and separate the T/C group samples 
by districts (column 2 for Tasikmalaya and column 3 for Ciamis). Instead of the 3-size categories tested 
above, we use a finer grained, 5-size category, including: small, medium, large, grand, and no size grading 
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(see footnote 5 for detail). Again the small size category is use as the baseline, and all other size 
categories are included in the ordinary least squares regression as dummy variables. 
 
Table 5: Robustness Check 
 
 (1) Wet Market (2) Wet Market (3) Wet Market (4) Supermarket 
Retail Format/ 
Market Traditional 
Traditional/Competitive 
(Tasikmalaya) 
Traditional/Competitive 
(Ciamis) Modern 
No grading 0.158* (1.830) 0.576*** (4.641) –0.111 (–0.633) 0.117 (0.889) 
Medium 0.216*** (2.584) 0.134 (1.395) 0.178 (1.161) 0.292** (2.431) 
Large 0.388*** (4.292) 0.187 (1.620) 0.262 (1.542) 0.362*** (2.842) 
Grand 0.280** (2.189) 0.094 (0.690) 0.396* (1.924) 0.583*** (3.529) 
Sort_size 0.401*** (4.019) 0.035 (0.418) 0.259* (1.889) 0.117* (1.674) 
Sort_color –0.097 (–1.593) 0.302*** (3.140) –0.095 (–0.736) –0.154** (–2.178) 
Sort_quality 0.009 (0.138) –0.183** (–2.573) 0.183* (1.784) 0.068 (0.969) 
Hot beauty  0.433*** (5.246) –0.461*** (–4.686) –0.419*** (–3.319) 0.140 (1.160) 
Straight   0.128 (1.020) –0.306*** (–3.332) –0.304*** (–2.679) 0.184 (1.505) 
Curly 0.326*** (6.157) 0.011 (0.105) –0.074 (–0.585) 0.135 (1.108) 
Seasonal controls        
Dry, July 0.004 (0.056) 0.043 (0.636) –0.214* (–1.881) 0.018 (0.238) 
Rain, September 0.033 (0.700) –0.017 (–0.296) –0.218** (–2.179) –0.153** (–2.127) 
Within season controls       
Middle  0.167*** (3.440) –0.207*** (–2.641) 0.106 (0.917) –0.010 (–0.112) 
Late  0.002 (0.034) –0.484*** (–4.237) –0.116 (–0.761) –0.007 (–0.056) 
constant 7.929*** (77.609) 8.626*** (62.767) 9.003*** (41.828) 8.539*** (47.475) 
adjR2 0.126  0.366  –0.111 (–0.633) 0.117 (0.889) 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01; ^ are p-value for Prob. > chi2. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
We find that even with more precise size characteristics, the premiums for bigger chilies 
remain insignificantly different from the small-sized chilies for the farmers selling to the T/C buyer. 
Also, there were few postharvest activities where markets are competitive. In contrast, the premium 
paid for bigger chilies is significant and positive for the producers who sell either to traditional markets 
where no competition from supermarkets exists, or who sell to modern markets. The size coefficients 
are all insignificantly different from zero in the two T/C markets, with the exception of the no grading 
dummy for the Tasikmalaya producers and the grand size dummy for the Ciamis producers. 
 
The results support our prediction that for producers who remain traditional market suppliers 
in areas where modern market buyers are present, the quality premium rewarded is negatively affected 
as compared to traditional market suppliers in the district without the presence of modern market 
buyers. The two regressions for the T/C groups—Tasikmalaya and Ciamis, which were previously 
pooled—are also quite different. The stark difference in the explanatory power (R-square) suggests 
the existence of a unique pricing mechanism for the Tasikmalaya market, of which the model 
specification may have captured some unknown spurious effect. 
 
The overall trend is that quality-based price premiums are mostly monotonically increasing 
with quality in both the traditional and modern markets, regardless of competition, with the exception 
of the premium for grand chilies in the traditional market, which is smaller than the premium for large 
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chilies. The quality premium for medium, large, and grand chili sizes in the traditional and modern 
markets are all significantly different from the small chilies. 
 
Comparing farmers who sell to modern versus traditional buyers, chilies of greater size are 
positively rewarded with higher prices. The producers who sell to supermarkets receive a 58% higher 
price premium for their grand chilies as compared to their small chilies, while the grand chilies are only 
rewarded with 28% higher price than small chilies for farmers who sell to traditional wet markets. The 
large size premium is similar among supermarket (36%) and traditional market buyers (39%), while the 
premium received for medium chilies is still greater for the supermarket buyers (29%) as compared to 
the traditional market buyers (22%). 
 
 
V. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The rapid transformation of the global value chain for agriculture has sparked a supermarket 
revolution. This has been welcomed as an instrument that can help address rural poverty where it is 
most stubbornly embedded. Various studies have highlighted the positive welfare effect on producers 
who successfully integrate into the modern retail value chain, but these have neglected the negative 
effect on the producers who are left behind in the transformation. 
 
For chili farmers in Indonesia’s West Java region, the impacts of supermarket competition with 
traditional markets have been mixed. Farmers who sell to the modern sector receive higher prices for 
any given quality than their neighbors in regions where the modern sector is not yet a buyer. This 
supports the literature that has concluded that the modernization of agrifood value chains can 
contribute to poverty reduction. 
 
However, this result is tempered with the observation that in regions where both modern and 
traditional buyers are present, farmers who supply traditional channels see their quality premiums fall 
in relation to areas where no modern channels are present. These farmers also have characteristics 
that make them less well-off than their neighbors, which suggest that those farmers with the weakest 
coping mechanisms are further impoverished by the presence of competition. They are not just 
relatively worse off, but absolutely worse off as well. 
 
This has two implications for governments that seek to use integration into the agrifood value 
chain as an instrument to reduce poverty. The first is that along with policies designed to facilitate 
entry into modern retail, governments might smooth the unintended negative price effects by building 
in social protection measures. This would ensure that farmers who are not able to take advantage of 
this channel do not fall below (or further below) the poverty line. 
 
A second implication is that more effective implementation of public food safety standards 
may ease the compression of price premiums by traditional market buyers. Globally, it is the adherence 
to quality standards that set the modern sector apart. The price premium offered by the modern sector 
is a reward for products that meet unobservable health and safety standards. If public standards move 
closer to private standards we should see higher returns to quality in traditional markets. 
 
This research offers some important reminders with respect to the issue of linking between the 
transformations of agrifood value chains with domestic poverty outcomes. But it also flags some 
important issues on which further research is needed. First, the majority of the literature on issues of 
the impact of modernization on smallholder outcomes is cross-sectional. Studies using time series data 
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would provide critical insight into the dynamics of returns to quality over time. This would enable 
further exploration of the impact of supermarkets on prices as the value chain evolves. 
 
Second, both the policy and the academic literature tend to look for solutions that would 
enable excluded smallholders to link into modern retail channels. But we do not yet have a good idea of 
how smallholders learn. Do they upgrade as a result of demonstration effects from their neighbors? Or 
do they need additional training or infrastructure? This kind of data is likely to be country and product 
specific and will have to be answered through additional case studies. 
 
By contributing to an increasing body of literature on how the transformation of agrifood value 
chains impact small farmers on the ground, we sought to direct attention beyond the question of how 
to plug more farms into the system. And instead ask the question of how to ensure that those who are 
not plugged in do not fall below the poverty baseline. 
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